On mobile the key comes from the platform keychain — tied to device unlock, not the app. On desktop it's machine-derived. The decoy PIN threat model is coercion — someone watching you unlock. If an attacker already has filesystem access, you've got bigger problems than the PIN.
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- Posts
- 9
- Comments
- 19
- Joined
- 2 mo. ago
Open Source @lemmy.ml I built an orbital graph as an alternative navigation for my open-source messenger
Privacy @lemmy.world Emergency PIN with a full decoy environment - ONYX v1.5-beta
Selfhosted @lemmy.world ONYX v1.5-beta - A Different Way to Navigate Conversations
Selfhosted @lemmy.world ONYX v1.4-beta: voice channels for LAN parties and a media player that actually looks good
Open Source @lemmy.ml ONYX: autostart, reactions, blocking.
Selfhosted @lemmy.world ONYX 1.3-beta — reactions, blocking, and notification privacy
Open Source @lemmy.ml ONYX v1.2-beta - need a feedback!
Privacy @lemmy.world I tried to build a messenger that doesn't make you choose between privacy and convenience.
Selfhosted @lemmy.world ONYX: self-hosted messenger with LAN mode and E2EE — an indie project story
Yeah, you're right. I'll fix this in the next update.