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traxanh [ze/zir, xey/xem]

@ traxanh @hexbear.net

Posts
3
Comments
8
Joined
10 mo. ago

I'm not that active on this account anymore. I still occasionally post news and drop stuff. Tbh, I use Hexbear for the emotes lol, though I mostly browse Lemmygrad for news. I rarely log into my account unless I have something to do, so I might miss notifications.

  • Tbh I don't use Facebook and don't know this group. But on the homophobia part the Burkina Faso case is interesting. They banned homosexuality as a 'colonial product.' Here it's different. Cultural imports made LGBTQ+ people more visible. Old homophobia didn't disappear. So now there's conflict. That conflict is how change happens. There's this guy I heard about who brought a knife to threaten his siblings for having same-sex partners. Now he's slowly accepting them. That's exactly how it works. More visibility forces confrontation. Confrontation forces change.

    As for the nationalist part, the "patsoc" stuff (honestly, I don't even know what that word means) serves the party's interest, channels popular energy into supporting the system. The homophobia in pages like Tifosi is organic backlash to visibility. The party doesn't encourage it but doesn't seriously challenge it either. They tolerate advocacy within limits and restrict it when it conflicts with political stability.

  • Lingering sentiment in southern Vietnam toward the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) is rooted in history. Many of the most reactionary elements fled to the U.S. after 1975. Their relatives remain, supported by remittances and pathways to U.S. citizenship, creating a material basis for pro-American sympathy.

    Historically, Vietnam's relationship with China is defined by centuries of domination contrasted with a brief period of communist camaraderie. The fraternal bond between Ho Chi Minh and Mao was genuine, but it was catastrophically damaged by the 1979 border war and the conflict over Cambodia. The persistent South China Sea disputes, a major point of contention from the late 20th century onward, have continuously strained the relationship. These maritime conflicts transform historical grievance into a present-day, tangible issue of sovereignty and resources.

    This shifting perception coincided with Đổi Mới. To develop, Vietnam opened to the global economy. The nearest, richest market was the West. This created a new material base:

    • The South, with its ports and historical links, became the engine for Western-facing trade and investment.

    • This base then shaped the ideological superstructure: a generation in the South now sees the U.S. as a primary partner for development and, for some, a potential strategic counterweight.

    The North retains stronger memories of the wars with both the U.S. and China. The state, pursuing national development, intentionally invested in the South to harness its proximity to Western markets.

    The southern economic base, built on this Western integration, naturally fostered a new ideological reality: a generation more oriented toward global consumerism than party doctrine. This is not a failure of propaganda but a dialectical outcome of the development strategy. Systemic corruption emerged as a severe, destabilizing cost of this rapid economic model. The party's perpetual and contradictory project is to manage the resulting ideological drift while checking the corruption that threatens its legitimacy, all to maintain enough discipline for the state machinery to function and prevent the corrosion of the party structure itself.

  • The signatory list for the Hanoi Convention has been disclosed. As expected, the key states leading the charge for a multipolar world and digital sovereignty have signed: Russia, China, DPRK, Cuba, Belarus, and Iran.

    And, in a move that should surprise no one, the United States is conspicuously absent.

  • You can read the Vietnam-China Joint Statement here. Statement #10 explicitly commits both sides to 'persevere in friendly consultation...' and to 'take no action that can complicate the situation or extend disputes.'

    This is not the first joint statement to address the East Sea issue. The consistency across them shows this isn't just diplomatic boilerplate; it reveals a shared, strategic priority: to manage and contain the dispute rather than let it define the entire relationship. Economic ties, party-to-party solidarity, and regional stability are simply more important to both sides than escalating a maritime quarrel. The repeated commitment to this framework is evidence of that calculated choice

  • Well, I'd say the relationship has been improving gradually for years, and even more since our new General Secretary was appointed. The tariff things gave it another big boost. We're seeing more state visits and high-level meetings now than ever before. They've also become much more open to doing business across many new sectors

  • I've seen a lot of AES slander on removed, and as so the 'đu càng' in Vietnam. The criticism from both sides feels like an automatic response, you know? I don't even pay much mind to it, it's often the corrupt actions of some officials that cloud people's view of the party's actual work. And don't even get me started on the infighting between Chinese and Vietnamese netizens on TikTok and Xiaohongshu, gosh, those people are insufferable. 'Oh the leaders in Vietnam did something good? 'Ah! They did their homework.'

  • Obviously there are millions of communists where I live anyway, maybe I'm being paranoid

  • Ask Lemmygrad @lemmygrad.ml

    Are Lemmygrad and Hexbear safe for AES (Already Existing Socialism) comrades?

  • I feel like China keeps making scientific breakthroughs every day at this point