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WilsonWilson [comrade/them, any]

@ WilsonWilson @hexbear.net

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14
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83
Joined
5 yr. ago

imitator of Christ, wife, horsewoman, paralegal, world citizen

  • I've been thinking about what Russia could do to send a message. They probably won't hit a civilian target. They haven't really done anything like that since the start of the war, it would give Ukrainians another event to rally around like Bucha and probably invite more civilian strikes. They could do a military counter-strike but they've done that every day since the start and it won't be interpreted as a message. If it was my choice I would consider whacking Budanov. Ukrainian on the street doesn't seem to be too fond of him but he is important to the Ukrainian leadership. Bonus points because he's the CIA's main squeeze.

  • year of our lord 2525

    Peruvian Election Update

    99.9997% of the votes counted

  • Warrem Mosler ftw

  • Chicago gas prices soar past $6 a gallon in some areas, Illinois gas nearly 50 cents above national average

    Gas prices in Chicago have risen above $6 a gallon for regular in some neighborhoods, while Illinois is nearly 50 cents above the national average cost for fuel. In Bucktown, one Shell station on Armitage, right off the Kennedy Expressway, regular gas is now $6.29 for a gallon of regular; $5.99 a gallon if you pay for a car wash, as of Monday morning. Chicago gas prices rose 62 cents in just the past week, GasBuddy reported Monday morning, and currently average $5.07 a gallon for regular. Prices are about 63 cents a gallon more than one month ago, and $1.62 higher than one yera ago.

  • Slop. @hexbear.net

    Livin' His Best Life

  • On 24 December 1971, the 497th serious warning had been issued, but they were not followed by any significant consequences.

  • The boer just suspended AryJ. They were too decent and honest for that app anyway.

  • thought it was Kyle Kulinski for a minute brb going blonde

  • they don't have any cards as I look at my 2 of clubs pair

  • Liberals: "I am sorry, but I couldn't help myself. It's in my nature."

  • Interesting gcc related thread from xitter by:

    Iyad El-Baghdadi is a Palestinian writer, activist and entrepreneur, and founder/president of the Kawaakibi Foundation and its website The Arab

    Works in the oil markets via Oslo, Norway His book

    xcancel thread link

    Overall assessment of the war

    • Conflict is on an escalation/attrition path with no realistic short‑term off‑ramp.
    • Iran sees the situation as existential and therefore cannot de‑escalate without serious guarantees; it still has not used the full spectrum of its capabilities (e.g. regular army/shadow navy, maximum Houthi disruption, sustained strikes on Gulf civilian targets).
    • Israel will not stop on its own; the US political/military leadership is structurally and personally incapable of absorbing the “L” and stepping back.
    • Likely timeline: this war phase runs at least to end of the year, potentially longer, with conditions changing non‑linearly (step‑changes/phase shifts) rather than gradually.

    • Attrition is not “week 1 scaled up”; it has thresholds.
    • Think of a wrecking ball hitting a building
    • First hit: a lot of dust and broken windows, but the building still stands.
    • Second hit: still standing, more visible damage; people think “okay, just more of the same.”
    • Third hit: the load‑bearing structure finally gives way and the entire building collapses into rubble, and at that point you cannot go back.
    • The war is now moving from the “first/second hit” phase toward these structural thresholds in energy markets, air defense capacity, and social psychology.

    • Physical supply from the Gulf is shrinking faster than financial markets have priced in; current prices still reflect “normality + risk premium,” not a structural supply shock.
    • Expectation: in ~weeks 6–10 of the war, oil and jet fuel prices are likely to spike sharply (working assumption: prices roughly doubling)
    • Key point: you cannot “print molecules”; financial engineering cannot solve a physical shortage of energy.

    Early signals already visible:

    • EU discussing or beginning rationing measures.
    • Egypt introducing curfews to cut energy use.
    • Thailand/Philippines and others starting “energy emergency” narratives and micro‑measures (e.g. turning off elevators, pushing stair use, night-time restrictions).

    Consequences of a real spike:

    • Flight cancellations and route reductions; even if you have a ticket, flights may not operate because every leg loses money.
    • Supply chains seize: higher transport costs push up food and basic goods; for some routes, it’s not just “expensive” but literally “not available.”
    • Countries highly dependent on imported energy and imported food are exposed: they have money, but may not be able to physically buy what isn’t there or can’t be shipped safely

    • Iranian drones and missiles are cheap to produce and can be sent in high volumes; interceptors are expensive, slow to manufacture, and produced in small numbers.
    • The US, “the biggest economy in the world”, can only produce on the order of tens (not hundreds) of certain interceptors per month.
    • Every wave of Iranian/Houthi projectiles drains the finite global interceptor stockpile; it takes months (or longer) to rebuild.

    Early sign:

    • Signs UAE & Israel already rationing interceptors: Only intercepting what they consider “priority” threats (e.g. specific ballistic missiles, key infrastructure).
    • Letting other projectiles go through or accepting some level of damage.

    As stocks fall further:

    • States will face “Sophie’s choice” defense decisions: protect the main airport or the refinery; the tourist attraction or the presidential palace.
    • Once enough high‑impact strikes get through, the political and economic psychology in these countries may break sharply (see Threshold 3).

    • Based on personal contacts, regular people in the Gulf, especially the UAE, are in a mix of deep anxiety and denial:
    • Many hope the war will “cool down” and that daily life and jobs will continue more or less as normal.
    • Some are frozen, delaying decisions because they see no obvious safe alternative.
    • This is partly rooted in a linear mindset: people expect week 10 to look like week 5 “but a bit worse,” not a fundamentally different world.

    If (God forbid, may it never happen) a major mass‑casualty or high‑symbolic event occurs, or once shortages become concrete (food, fuel, flights), denial can flip to panic quickly:

    • Capital controls (limits on moving money out) to stop capital flight.
    • Exit visa regimes or de facto travel restrictions, making it impossible or very hard to leave even if you can pay.
    • Racialized scapegoating or social breakdown as people compete over scarce resources.

    Structural vulnerability:

    • Gulf states import almost all their food; they have almost no agricultural resilience.
    • They have systematically undermined potential regional partners (e.g. by helping destroy/cripple Sudan, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Yemen after the Arab Spring), leaving themselves with fewer capable neighbors to rely on.
    • If Iran asserts de facto control over the Strait of Hormuz (alone or with Oman), Gulf monarchies become strategically hostage to Iran’s terms

    • Iran has so far shown intentional control over escalation:
    • Houthis/Yemen not fully unleashed (they have not yet tried to fully close the Red Sea).
    • No systematic targeting of Gulf civilian targets on the scale they could potentially wage.
    • Iranian regular army and shadow navy have not entered the war as full actors.
    • Tehran calibrates its moves to match and slightly exceed US/Israeli escalation, not to blow everything up at once.

    Likely end‑state Iran is working toward:

    • De facto or formal control/co‑control over key maritime chokepoints (e.g. Strait of Hormuz).
    • This becomes the simplest mechanism for “reparations”: long‑term control over tolls, flows, and leverage on Gulf exports without needing formal Western concessions.

    US/Trump camp misreads:

    • They underestimate Iranian naval capability because it doesn’t resemble US blue‑water doctrine.
    • They assume one or two massive blows will “teach Iran a lesson” and force retreat
    • In reality, Iran is structurally incentivized to keep pushing as long as its regime survives and as long as US/Israel continue

    UAE

    • Most exposed Gulf state: highly globalised, heavily imported food/energy, tiny citizen base, large expatriate population.
    • Talk in Abu Dhabi/Dubai circles about “joining” the war is strategically absurd; the UAE lacks the independent military capacity and would invite harsher retaliation.

    If the UAE faces sustained hits, you get:

    • Economic implosion, job losses, deflationary spiral (people leave → demand collapses → more layoffs → more departures).
    • Potential social fragmentation and ugly racialization.

    Qatar

    • Better positioned than UAE (less aggressive posture, different alliances), but still structurally dependent on energy exports and imports for food.

    Pakistan

    • Already feeling the shock: recent ~120% jump in electricity prices; government discussing “smart lockdown”‑style measures to cut consumption.
    • Political economy: Formal economy is small; a huge undocumented economy (smuggling from Iran/Afghanistan/Central Asia) underpins real life.
    • Government can’t/won’t tax elites/real estate, so it leans heavily on fuel levies to show revenue to IMF, pushing pain onto ordinary people.

    At the same time:

    • Pakistan is agricultural and has large territory/population; nobody wants to destabilise it in this context.
    • It’s emerging as a useful diplomatic actor (alongside Oman) in any potential de‑escalation path.
    • Iran is already allowing Pakistani tankers and legal imports of Iranian goods, giving Pakistan some energy back door

    • Those in Gulf states, especially UAE, face a narrowing window:
    • As long as energy and flights “more or less work,” people can still move money, relocate, or at least plan.
    • Once thresholds are crossed (energy spike, visible air‑defense failures, real panic), options collapse quickly - flights disappear, borders harden, capital controls appear.

    Recommended bias is to over‑prepare rather than under‑react: better to be “alarmist but early” than trapped in denial when the phase shift comes.

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  • it's all circles all the way down 6.28318...

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  • I almost feel sorry for Nutty-yahoo. Ha ha just kidding eat shit Bibi lmao. Literal river of salty tears coming out of xitter rn.

    Feels good man.

  • Isn't there somebody he forgot to ask. Starts with an I and ends in srael.

  • Slop. @hexbear.net

    they lost their minds

  • Slop. @hexbear.net

    Run, Forrest, run

  • Chapotraphouse @hexbear.net

    new Iran lego video

    xcancel.com /ExplosiveMediaa/status/2039499365425820111
  • Earth @hexbear.net

    Trump administration looks to give oil and gas companies free rein to drive extinction of endangered species

    www.sierraclub.org /articles/2026/03/playing-god-gulf-trump-administration-looks-give-oil-and-gas-companies-free-rein
  • memes @hexbear.net

    Tehran if the USA didn't exist

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    Black Stalin - Ah Feel To Party

  • Slop. @hexbear.net

    DST

  • Slop. @hexbear.net

    reindeer games

  • Chapotraphouse @hexbear.net

    Reddit funded anti-drone turret

  • Slop. @hexbear.net

    have you apologized to president trump?

    www.tiktok.com /@maureenencinas/video/7607082120149880094
  • Chapotraphouse @hexbear.net

    Break Me Off A Piece Of That Kit Kat Bar! (tm)

  • Science @hexbear.net

    3I/ATLAS